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“Everything is relative in this world, where change alone endures.” 
-Leon Trotsky1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Or so the saying goes.  This may no longer be the case in a 
narrow category of regulatory takings claims in Minnesota.  
Although takings jurisprudence in the United States, especially 
with regard to regulations, is notoriously enigmatic,2 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court recently attempted to clarify the murky waters by 
affirming the standard to be applied in airport zoning3 disputes in 
DeCook v. Rochester International Airport Joint Zoning Board.4  In so 
doing, however, it opened the door to a new inquiry into how 
much economic impact a regulation must have on the market value 
of a landowner’s property in order to be considered a taking. 
This note begins by surveying important cases in federal and 
Minnesota takings law that lay a foundation for DeCook.5  With that 
background in mind, it discusses the facts and reasoning of the 
court in DeCook6 and then analyzes the decision.7  It concludes by 
arguing that the decision, while seeming to clear the muddle of 
Minnesota regulatory takings jurisprudence by creating a bright-
line rule, undermines the apparent virtue of the rule for which it 
advocates by shifting the inquiry in airport zoning takings cases 
 
 1. LEON TROTSKY, THE REVOLUTION BETRAYED 79 (Max Eastman trans., Dover 
Publ’ns, Inc. 2004) (1937). 
 2. E.g., GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT 30 (1998) 
(suggesting regulatory takings law is “incoherent and muddled”); Allison Dunham, 
Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation 
Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 63 (1962) (calling takings law the “crazy-quilt pattern 
of Supreme Court doctrine”); James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1997) (“Regulatory takings are widely regarded as a 
puzzle.”); William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of 
Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1151 (1997) 
(noting that the Takings Clause “is famous for inspiring disagreement”). 
 3. See MINN. STAT. § 360.062(a) (2010) (codifying the existence of dangers to 
lives and property of those in and around an airport); MINN. R. 8800.2400, subpt. 
6(E)(1) (2011) (describing the interests airport safety zoning balances); DeCook 
v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 307 n.5 (Minn. 2011) 
(“Airport runway safety zoning is arguably sui generis . . . .”).  See generally 1 
DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST AERONAUTICS § 6.01 (5th ed. 2002) (discussing the policy 
bases for airport zoning standards). 
 4. 796 N.W.2d. 299 (Minn. 2011). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
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from a balancing test to a debate about what constitutes a 
“significant” amount of money without providing guidance as how 
to analyze that question.8 
II. HISTORY 
Because the language of the takings provision of the 
Minnesota Constitution9 is similar to10 but somewhat broader than11 
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,12 Minnesota takings 
law is, to some extent, intertwined with federal takings law.  It is 
appropriate, therefore, to begin with federal law and cases 
interpreting the Fifth Amendment13 before turning to Minnesota 
takings law. 
A. Federal Takings 
1. Constitutional Basis 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects 
individuals from the exercise of eminent domain14 without 
adequate compensation and has been read as “a tacit recognition 
that the power to take private property exists.”15  Such a right has 
been viewed as inherent in sovereignty.16  The protection of citizens 
 
 8. See infra Part V. 
 9. “Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use 
without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured.”  MINN. CONST. art. I, § 
13; see also Floyd B. Olson, The Enigma of Regulatory Takings, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 433, 437 (1994) (“The language ‘destroyed or damaged’ was not a part of the 
original constitution . . . .”). 
 10. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 631 (Minn. 
2007). 
 11. Id. at 632 n.5 (citing State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992)). 
 12. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 13. For a survey of the major theoretical approaches to takings jurisprudence, 
see SKOURAS, supra note 2, at 67–87.  
 14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “eminent domain” 
as “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned 
property, esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable 
compensation for the taking”). 
 15. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.11 (4th 
ed. 1991) (quoting United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241 (1946)). 
 16. NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS 3–4 (1997).  
These authors explain that this is the reason why the power of eminent domain is 
not explicitly listed in the Constitution.  Id. at 4; see also SKOURAS, supra note 2, at 
11 (tracing authority for the power of eminent domain back to the Roman period 
but noting such authority is usually traced back to the Magna Carta). 
3
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from this inherent power via the Fifth Amendment has been 
interpreted as 
prevent[ing] the public from loading upon one individual 
more than his just share of the burdens of government, 
and say[ing] that when he surrenders to the public 
something more and different from that which is exacted 
from other members of the public, a full and just 
equivalent shall be returned to him.17 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies this 
mandate to state governments.18 
The Supreme Court has classified takings claims into two 
general categories: physical occupation and regulatory.19  The 
former occurs when the government physically occupies land.20  
Protection from this type of taking is understood as the original 
meaning behind the clause.21  In the latter instance, landowners 
argue that the use of their land has been so restricted as to 
constructively constitute a taking.22  Although regulatory takings 
were not recognized until the late nineteenth century,23 this area of 
 
 17. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). 
 18. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.01 (5th ed. 2003); Edward J. 
Sullivan & Kelly D. Connor, Making the Continent Safe for Investors—NAFTA and the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, in CURRENT TRENDS AND PRACTICAL STRATEGIES 
IN LAND USE LAW AND ZONING 47, 50 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2004). 
 19. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 10–11 (2011). 
 20. MANDELKER, supra note 18, § 2.02.  “The modern significance of physical 
occupation is that courts, while they sometimes do hold nontrespassory injuries 
compensable, never deny compensation for a physical takeover.”  Frank I. 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of “Just 
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967); see, e.g., Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (upholding the 
view that physical occupation of property constitutes a taking). 
 21. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 104 (1973) (“There is no 
evidence that the founding fathers ever conceived that the taking clause could 
establish any sort of restrictions on the power to regulate the use of land.”); see also 
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 792 (1995) (noting that early state case law 
required compensation only for physical appropriation of property).  For an 
overview of the development of the takings clause through Pennsylvania Coal, see 
id. at 798–803. 
 22. See MANDELKER, supra note 18, § 2.01. 
 23. Terri L. Lindfors, Note, Regulatory Takings and the Expansion of Burdens on 
Common Citizens, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 255, 261 (1998); see also Thomas A. 
Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Taking 
Doctrine: The Principles of “Noxious Use,” “Average Reciprocity of Advantage,” and 
“Bundle of Rights” from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 653, 660 (1987) (stating that Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), was the 
“first comprehensive analysis” of regulatory takings law).  In Mugler, the Supreme 
4
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law has proven to be very contentious, as the discussion below 
shows. 
The exercise of eminent domain is closely tied to the police 
power.24  The police power in this context allows state governments 
“to regulate land use and personal property without incurring the 
obligation of paying compensation.”25  Drawing a line between 
when government regulation is a permitted use of the police power 
and when it enters into the realm of an unconstitutional taking is 
difficult, however, resulting in a confusing morass of rules and 
analyses.26  As one commentator noted, “The real bases for many of 
these decisions may simply be an unarticulated sense of fairness or 
justice that is shrouded in a cloud of paraphrased quotes from 
unreconciled state and federal decisions.”27  With that in mind, this 
note turns to examine how the Supreme Court has tried to analyze 
 
Court held that a state statute which prohibited the sale or manufacture of alcohol 
was not a taking of a brewery owner’s property because the legislation was made to 
abate a public nuisance.  Mugler, 123 U.S. at 675. 
 24. Arthur G. Boylan, Note, Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: The Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s Muddled Analysis in Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 29 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 695, 703 (2002).  Generally, the police power is “[t]he inherent and 
plenary power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to preserve the 
public security, order, health, morality, and justice.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 14, at 1276.  More specifically, it is “[a] state’s Tenth Amendment right, 
subject to due-process and other limitations, to establish and enforce laws 
protecting the public’s health, safety, and general welfare, or to delegate this right 
to local governments.”  Id.  The police power is generally “employed to protect the 
health, safety, and morals of the community in the form of such things as fire 
regulations, garbage disposal control, and restrictions upon prostitution and 
liquor.  But it has never been thought that government authority under the police 
power was limited to those narrow uses.”  Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police 
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964) (citations omitted); see also Dan Herber, 
Comment, Surviving the View Through the Lochner Looking Glass: Tahoe-Sierra and 
the Case for Upholding Development Moratoria, 86 MINN. L. REV. 913, 918–19 (2002) 
(discussing the relationship between eminent domain and the state’s police 
power). 
 25. Brian D. Lee, Note, Regulatory Takings Depriving All Economically Viable Use 
of a Property Owner’s Land Require Just Compensation Unless the Government Can Identify 
Common Law Nuisance or Property Principles Furthered by the Regulation—Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1840, 1844 n.26 (1993).  While the police power is technically possessed only by 
the states, not the federal government, it is necessary to keep the concept of police 
power in mind while discussing Supreme Court takings cases because the Court is 
addressing the constitutionality of state actions.  DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., 
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 74 (8th ed. 
2011).   
 26. See Olson, supra note 9, at 450 (“[Court] efforts . . . have yielded only 
profound confusion for practitioners.”). 
 27. Id. 
5
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regulatory takings cases. 
2. Pennsylvania Coal 
The foundational U.S. Supreme Court case analyzing 
regulatory takings is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.28  In 
Pennsylvania Coal, owners of a home in Pennsylvania brought an 
action against the Pennsylvania Coal Company seeking to enjoin 
the company from mining coal underneath their property.29  The 
owners purchased the land from the coal company in 1878, 
knowing that the deed sold only the surface rights of the land and 
expressly reserved for the coal company the right to remove all coal 
beneath it.30  On May 27, 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature 
adopted the Kohler Act, which forbade mining anthracite coal “in 
such way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any 
structure used as human habitation.”31  Although the Act made 
some exceptions,32 both parties in the suit agreed that it applied in 
this instance and that it effectively “destroy[ed] previously existing 
rights of property and contract.”33  The Court was asked to consider 
whether this result of the Kohler Act was a permissible use of the 
police power or whether it constituted a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.34 
The Court, in an oft-quoted opinion by Justice Holmes, held 
that the statute amounted to a taking.35  While noting that 
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident 
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
 
 28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  “Genealogists of . . . regulatory takings 
jurisprudence have found their Adam” in this case.  Robert Brauneis, The 
Foundation of Our “Regulatory Takings” Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice 
Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 615 (1996); 
see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 13–27 (1995) (analyzing the 
opinion and arguing that the Court’s ruling had little effect on relations between 
coal companies and owners of surface rights); see also Hippler, supra note 23, at 
656–80 (describing the theory of regulatory takings before Pennsylvania Coal).  But 
cf. Brauneis, supra, at 701 (arguing that Pennsylvania Coal’s foundational status in 
regulatory takings jurisprudence stems from “erroneous genealogy”). 
 29. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 412–13. 
 32. Id. at 413.  Among the exceptions are instances where the same person 
owns the surface and subsurface land and the coal is at least 150 feet away from 
another’s property.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 412. 
 35. Id. at 414–15. 
6
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change in the general law,”36 the Court nevertheless held that the 
Act was not a valid exercise of the police power because the extent 
of the public’s interest in the statute was limited37 and the personal 
safety issues that subsidence mining created could be dealt with by 
providing notice to the owners of surface rights.38  A regulation that 
“goes too far”39 results in a taking because, although the Fifth 
Amendment provides for the government to take private property 
that is needed for public use, it ensures that compensation must be 
made for it.40  The Court stated that a limited reading of the 
amendment is necessary because “the natural tendency of human 
nature is to extend the qualification [of the police power] more 
and more until at last private property disappears.”41  Exactly when 
a regulation “goes too far,” however, and private property begins to 
vanish is the million-dollar question.  While Justice Holmes did not 
provide a bright-line rule, he did suggest that the “extent of the 
diminution” in value of the property is a factor in answering this 
question42 and that “[w]hen [the diminution in value] reaches a 
certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.”43 
The decision in Pennsylvania Coal was not unanimous.  Justice 
Brandeis dissented, arguing that the coal company’s mining of coal 
so as to cause subsidence of the land amounted to a public 
 
 36. Id. at 413. 
 37. Id. at 413–14.  “Holmes saw no qualitative difference between traditional 
takings and traditional exercises of the police power, but only a continuum in 
which established property interests were asked to yield more or less to the 
pressures of public demands.”  Sax, supra note 24, at 41. 
 38. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.  Further on in the opinion, Justice Holmes 
addresses the safety issue again by differentiating between the case at bar and an 
earlier case.  Id. at 415.  In Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that a 
legislative act requiring coal mining companies to leave a pillar of coal as a barrier 
between their mine and the mine of another was constitutional.  232 U.S. 531, 544 
(1914).  The purpose behind the law was to ensure the safety of workers in an 
adjacent mine if a neighboring mine should be abandoned and fill with water.  Pa. 
Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.  This case was different, Holmes argued, because the 
latter act “was a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and 
secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a 
justification of various laws.”  Id. 
 39. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.  This standard has been described as “more 
of an observation about the difficulty in deciding when compensation should be 
paid than it is a rule capable of precise application.”  Olson, supra note 9, at 434. 
 40. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 413. 
 43. Id. 
7
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nuisance,44 and the police power is a recognized means45 of 
securing the abatement of such a nuisance,46 provided a public 
interest is protected47 and the means for protecting that interest are 
“appropriate.”48  When addressing Justice Holmes’s extent of 
diminution factor, Justice Brandeis argued that, should diminution 
in value be used to determine whether a regulation goes too far, 
the value of the taken property must be compared to the value of 
the property as a whole.49  Otherwise, every regulation could 
amount to a taking simply by changing the whole from which the 
 
 44. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. 
 46. This understanding of the role of the police power in takings claims is an 
expansion of a theory first set forth by Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623 (1887).  Sax, supra note 24, at 38–39; see also FISCHEL, supra note 28, at 61 
(“The ‘nuisance exception’ may be a sensible rule, but it begs the question of who 
is to decide what constitutes a nuisance.”); Lindfors, supra note 23, at 264 
(discussing Mugler). 
 47. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 418.  A “restriction imposed to protect the public 
health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking.  The restriction 
here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use.”  Id. at 417. 
 48. Id. at 418.  In addressing an exception in the statute for situations where 
one person owns both the surface and subsurface of the land, Justice Brandeis 
counters Justice Holmes’s argument by noting that such an exception is not 
necessary because, “[w]here the surface and the coal belong to the same person, 
self-interest would ordinarily prevent mining to such an extent as to cause a 
subsidence.”  Id. at 420.  Cf. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public 
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 172 (1971) (arguing that competing claims of property 
owners should be resolved by inquiring into what a single, rational owner of the 
affected resources would do).  A similar line of reasoning can be found in tort law 
and is exemplified by Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 
N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).  There, the court imposed damages on a steamship owner 
for damage sustained to a dock owned by another when the ship was tied fast to 
the dock during a storm.  Id. at 457–60, 124 N.W. at 221–22.  “[T]he defendant 
prudently and advisedly availed itself of the plaintiffs’ [dock] for the purpose of 
preserving its own more valuable property [the steamship], and the plaintiffs are 
entitled to compensation for the injury done.”  Id. at 460, 124 N.W. at 222.  Just as 
a prudent owner of both ship and dock would allow damage to be done to the less 
valuable item in order to preserve the more valuable one, so too the owner of the 
land with a house built upon it and the subsurface rights beneath that house 
would not mine in such a way as to cause the ground to subside unless the value of 
the coal within the land were enough to outweigh the cost of repairs to make the 
house inhabitable or the price of relocating. 
 49. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S at 419.  “[W]e should compare [the value of the coal 
kept in place by the restriction] with the value of all other parts of the land.  That 
is, with the value not of the coal alone, but with the value of the whole property.”  
Id.  Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) 
(“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments 
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been 
entirely abrogated.”). 
8
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part is derived.50  The quandary of deciding just what values should 
be compared in determining extent of diminution in value of 
property has been termed the “denominator problem”51 and 
persists in regulatory takings cases to this day.52 
3. Penn Central 
While Pennsylvania Coal established a general rule, it provided 
little instruction as to the application of that rule to subsequent 
disputes.  Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York53 
attempted to clarify the circumstances under which a regulation 
“goes too far.”  The Penn Central dispute centered on a proposed 
addition of a multi-story office building54 above New York City’s 
Grand Central Terminal,55 a building which had been designated56 
by the Landmarks Preservation Commission (Commission)57 as a 
landmark whose modification required approval from the 
Commission.58  The Commission refused to grant such approval,59 
and the owners of Grand Central Terminal filed suit.60  In a five-
three decision,61 the Court held that the Commission’s denial of 
the proposal to develop the space above Grand Central Terminal 
into an office building pursuant to the New York City Landmarks 
Law62 did not constitute a taking.63  
In so ruling, the Court enumerated three factors to be used 
when considering regulatory takings.  A court must weigh (1) the 
 
 50. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 419 (“The sum of the rights in the parts can not 
[sic] be greater than the rights in the whole.”). 
 51. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1112 n. 28 (7th ed. 2010). 
 52. See infra Parts II.A.3 and III. 
 53. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 54. For an artist’s rendering of the proposed designs, see DUKEMINIER, supra 
note 51, at 1117–18. 
 55. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 116. 
 56. Id. at 115–16. 
 57. For a general description of the law creating the Commission and the 
process through which landmark designations are made and can be appealed, see 
id. at 109–15. 
 58. Id. at 112. 
 59. Id. at 117. 
 60. Id. at 104, 119. 
 61. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens, 
penned a dissent that cited lack of an average reciprocity of advantage as a key 
factor for disagreeing with the majority’s opinion that the law did not constitute a 
taking in this circumstance.  Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 62. See id. at 109–10 for a general description of the law. 
 63. Id. at 138. 
9
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economic impact of the regulation on the landowner,64 (2) the 
extent to which the regulation interferes with “distinct investment-
backed expectations,”65 and (3) the character of the government 
action.66  The Court also noted that takings cases are “essentially ad 
hoc, factual inquiries.”67  Because of the nature of the inquiry and 
the factors described, this opinion has been criticized for leading to 
inconsistent results68 because the multiplicity of factors to be 
considered and then balanced in order to reach a conclusion 
creates considerable variability. 
B. Minnesota Takings 
1. Constitutional Basis 
Minnesota’s state constitution includes a takings provision,69 
but it is broader than its federal counterpart,70 thereby giving 
landowners additional protection.  Likewise, the state’s statutory 
definition of “taking” is also quite inclusive, encompassing “every 
interference, under the power of eminent domain, with the 
 
 64. Id. at 124. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  “A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with 
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . .”  Id. 
 67. Id.  Cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (“[Articulating 
when a regulation goes too far] is a question of degree—and therefore cannot be 
disposed of by general propositions.”). 
 68. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles 
Part I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1316 
(1989).  See id. at 1317–34 for a discussion of the four major takings tests 
delineated by the Supreme Court.  The Penn Central test is appropriate in most 
instances.  Boylan, supra note 24, at 701.  But “[i]t is difficult to discern from the 
Court’s takings decisions which test the Court would apply in any given case.”  
Peterson, supra, at 1316. 
 69. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 70. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Such an observation can also be made of 
twenty-four other state constitutions.  Allison J. Midden, Note, Taking of Access: 
Minnesota Supreme Court Declines to Allow Admission of Evidence of Diminished Access 
Due to Installation of a Median in a Takings Case, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 329, 337 
n.58 (1999); see, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22 (“[P]rivate property shall not be 
taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation 
therefor.”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“[P]rivate property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation.”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a) 
(“No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to 
public use without adequate compensation being made . . . .”).  The common law 
provides similarly broadened provisions in the other twenty-six states.  Boylan, 
supra note 24, at 705 n.90. 
10
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possession, enjoyment, or value of private property.”71  The purpose 
of the Minnesota takings provision, however, is the same as that of 
the Fifth Amendment: it “ensure[s] that the government cannot 
force ‘some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”72  
Because much of Minnesota regulatory takings law is based on 
reasoning adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, it is similarly 
confused,73 as is the proper place of the state’s police power.74   
2. McShane 
In certain instances, Minnesota employs rules other than the 
Penn Central balancing test to determine whether a taking has 
occurred.75  One of these is specific to airport zoning regulations 
and was first articulated in McShane v. City of Faribault.76  The 
McShanes, owners of sixty-five acres of land near the Faribault 
Municipal Airport,77 wanted to sell their land,78 which had been 
used for agricultural purposes,79 to developers.  Use of the land for 
agriculture had been made impractical or impossible by the 
trisection of the land by two highways, but the presence of the 
highways had increased the land’s value for commercial 
development.80  Shortly after the family had negotiated an 
agreement, which included an option to sell parcels of the land for 
commercial development, an ordinance was enacted that severely 
restricted the uses to which forty-two of the acres of land could be 
put.81  Suit was brought after attempts to have the ordinance 
repealed failed.82   
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the airport zoning 
 
 71. MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subdiv. 2 (2011). 
 72. Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996) 
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 73. Boylan, supra note 24, at 707–08. 
 74. State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 230, 158 N.W. 1017, 
1019 (1916) (admitting that the distinction between lawfully and unlawfully 
imposed restrictions is considered by courts on a case-by-case basis). 
 75. For a survey of these tests, see Lindfors, supra note 23, at 273–77. 
 76. 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980). 
 77. Id. at 255. 
 78. Id. at 256. 
 79. Id. at 255. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 255–56. 
 82. Id. at 256. 
11
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ordinance did constitute a compensable taking.83  In so holding, 
the court distinguished84 between regulations implemented for the 
benefit of a government enterprise85 and those which are enacted 
as part of a greater zoning scheme, so-called “‘arbitration’ 
regulations.”86  It held that, when land use regulations are 
implemented to benefit a specific governmental enterprise, such as 
an airport, a taking has occurred when a landowner’s property has 
suffered a “substantial and measurable decline in market value” 
due to the regulations.87  Because the parties in this case agreed the 
reduction was substantial, the court did not address an appropriate 
means of determining what constitutes “substantial.”88 
 
 83. Id. at 258–59. 
 84. Id. at 257 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 
(holding that regulation of land use is not a taking unless it deprives the property 
of all reasonable use)).  The court also drew upon the work of Professor Sax in 
determining that the maintenance of such a distinction was appropriate.  Id. at 
258 (citing Sax, supra note 24). 
 85. “Governmental enterprise” is “an enterprise undertaken by a 
governmental body, such as a parks department that creates a public park.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 611; see infra Part II.B.3; see also Sax, 
supra note 24, at 62 (providing a more comprehensive description of government 
enterprise). 
 86. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 306 
(Minn. 2011) (citing McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 258); see also Sax, supra note 24, at 
62–63 (providing a more comprehensive description of the arbitration function of 
government).  The appellants in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 
also argued that the Landmarks Law is an example of government acting in an 
enterprise function, creating a compensable taking.  438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978).  
The Court rejected this argument because the law “neither exploits appellants’ 
parcel for city purposes nor facilitates nor arises from any entrepreneurial 
operations of the city.”  Id. 
 87. McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 258–59. 
 88. Id. at 257.  In its recitation of the facts, however, the court showed that 
both parties came to such a conclusion by using percent diminution in value.  Id. 
at 256.  By the plaintiffs’ expert, the property’s value had been reduced from 
$522,000 to $360,000.  Id.  The defense contended that the value of one part of 
the land had been reduced from $63,740 to $32,520, and the value of the other 
part of the land had been reduced from $179,710 to $163,000.  Id.  In its opinion, 
the court errs in its arithmetic in two of the three estimates.  The opinion states 
the diminution in value based on the plaintiffs’ expert’s estimation was 67%, but 
dividing $360,000 by $522,000 yields 68.96% (or about 69%).  Id.  While the 
opinion states that the defendant’s expert’s estimation of the diminution in value 
of the first parcel was 50%, doing the math gives a result of 51.02% (or about 
51%).  Id.  The court was correct in the diminution in value of the second parcel 
of land by the defendant’s expert.  While the differences in sums may seem 
inconsequential, the failure of the court to check its math suggests a discomfort 
working with numbers that could lead to decisions based more on a gut feeling of 
how much diminution in value is too much rather than an analysis of what 
percentage crosses the line. 
12
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Although one of the remedies the McShanes requested from 
the court was an order compelling the city to begin condemnation 
proceedings,89 the Minnesota Supreme Court granted the city the 
option either to repeal the ordinance or to condemn the 
property.90 
3. The Enterprise/Arbitration Distinction 
A key component of the McShane decision was its insistence on 
the maintenance of a distinction between enterprise and 
arbitration regulations.  In an oft-cited article, Professor Sax, 
seemingly frustrated by the Supreme Court’s articulation of 
multiple and conflicting theories on regulatory takings analysis,91 
enunciated a new definition of property92 from which a new takings 
rule emerged: 
[W]hen an individual or limited group in society sustains 
a detriment to legally acquired existing economic values 
as a consequence of government activity which enhances 
the economic value of some governmental enterprise, 
then the act is a taking, and compensation is 
constitutionally required; but when the challenged act is 
an improvement of the public condition through 
resolution of conflict within the private sector of the 
society, compensation is not constitutionally required.93 
The underlying questions courts should be asking, Professor Sax 
suggested, are “to what kind of competition ought existing values 
be exposed; and, from what kind of competition ought existing 
values be protected.”94  When the government acts only to mediate 
 
 89. Id. at 255. 
 90. Id. 
 91. “It seems appropriate to inquire whether the currently available theories 
are capable of resolving the problem of the taking cases.”  Sax, supra note 24, at 
46.  For a survey of the theories that led Professor Sax to this conclusion, see id. at 
46–60. 
 92. Professor Sax defined property as 
a multitude of existing interests which are constantly interrelating with 
each other, sometimes in ways that are mutually exclusive. . . . It is more 
accurate to describe property as the value which each owner has left after 
the inconsistencies between the two competing owners have been 
resolved . . . . Property is thus the result of the process of competition. 
Id. at 61. 
 93. Id. at 67.  Professor Sax also noted two exceptions to the requirement for 
compensation for governmental enterprise: occasions that provide either a 
reciprocal benefit or an incidental benefit.  Id. at 73–74. 
 94. Id. at 61. 
13
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disputes among competing claimants of property, losses resulting 
from such action are not compensable.95  When the government is 
a participant in competition for resources and therefore acts in an 
enterprise capacity, however, concerns over “arbitrary, unfair, or 
tyrannical government”96 support requiring compensation.  
When considering the rule in relation to the Penn Central 
factors, Professor Sax’s formulation maintains that the character of 
the government action is the sole defining factor in a regulatory 
takings analysis;97 the economic impact of the regulation and the 
property owner’s investment-backed expectations have no place.  
The McShane standard slightly modifies Professor Sax’s rule by 
creating a hierarchy from the Penn Central factors.  A court first 
looks at the character of the government action.98  If the regulation 
was enacted in an arbitration capacity, there is no taking.99  A 
regulation resulting from a government’s enterprise function, 
however, requires the court to ask a second question: what was the 
economic impact of that regulation on the value of the property?100  
Under McShane, if it was significant, a taking has occurred.101  If 
not, however, despite the fact that the regulation came about as the 
result of a governmental enterprise, there has not been a taking.102  
Like Professor Sax’s rule, the McShane analysis ignores investment-
backed expectations. 
Interestingly, nine years before the McShane opinion was 
announced,103 Professor Sax wrote another piece in which he 
admitted that the theoretical underpinnings of his relatively simple 
rule based on the arbitration/enterprise distinction may be more 
complex than he originally understood.104  While the definition of 
property for which he advocated in this earlier article remained 
substantially similar,105 his subsequent approach yielded different 
 
 95. Id. at 62. 
 96. Id. at 64.  For a discussion of these concerns, see id. at 64–67. 
 97. Id. at 63. 
 98. See McShane v. City of Fairbault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. 1980). 
 99. Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978)). 
 100. See id. at 259. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. McShane cites Sax, supra note 24, which makes the arbitration/enterprise 
distinction, but it does not make any mention of his subsequent 1971 article.  
McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 258. 
 104. Sax, supra note 48, at 150 n.5.  
 105. Compare supra note 92 with the definition from Professor Sax’s 
14
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results in certain circumstances.106  Professor Sax created a new 
entity he termed “public rights.”107  To accommodate these 
interests, which should be viewed as comparable to private citizens’ 
right to property, he suggested: 
Any demand of a right to use property that has 
spillover effects[108] . . . may constitutionally be restrained, 
however severe the economic loss on the property owner, 
without any compensation being required; for each of the 
competing interests that would be adversely affected by 
such uses has, a priori, an equal right to be free of such 
burdens. 
. . . [A]ny uses of property that do not involve such 
spillover effects are constitutionally entitled to 
protection . . . .109 
The underlying purpose of this rule is to maintain a system of 
property rights that “maximiz[es] . . . the output of the entire 
resource base upon which competing claims of right are 
dependent, rather than maint[aining] . . . the profitability of 
individual parcels of property.”110 
 
subsequent article: 
Property does not exist in isolation. Particular parcels are tied to one 
another in complex ways, and property is more accurately described as 
being inextricably part of a network of relationships that is neither 
limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries with which 
the legal system is accustomed to dealing. 
Sax, supra note 48, at 152. 
 106. See infra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
 107. Sax, supra note 48, at 151.  “Much of what was formerly deemed a taking is 
better seen as an exercise of the police power in vindication of what shall be called 
‘public rights.’”  Id. 
 108. Professor Sax describes spillover effects as having one of three forms.  Id. 
at 161–62.  The first occurs when the owner of one land uses her land in a way that 
restricts the use of adjacent land, like coal mining that causes drainage into lower-
lying land.  Id. at 161.  The second is use of a common to which other owners have 
equal right.  Id.  The example Professor Sax used is dumping industrial water into 
a stream that a downstream landowner uses as a water supply.  Id.  The third type 
of spillover is use of a property that endangers “the health or well-being of others.”  
Id. at 162. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 172.  Put another way:  
[T]he proper decision as to competing property uses which involve 
spillover effects is that which a rational single owner would make if he 
were responsible for the entire network of resources affected, and if the 
distribution of gains and losses among the parcels of his total holding 
were a matter of indifference to him. 
Id.  This argument to internalize the externalities of an act can be found in other 
contexts.  Cf. Howard Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
15
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While the court in McShane did not mention Professor Sax’s 
modified view, it is not clear that doing so would have changed the 
outcome of McShane.111  Because the facts of McShane are very 
similar to those of DeCook, if this reasoning is correct, the effect of 
Professor Sax’s subsequent scholarship may also not have impacted 
the DeCook case.112 
4. Wensmann 
Twenty-seven years after McShane, in Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. 
City of Eagan,113 the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether a 
city’s refusal to amend a comprehensive city plan to permit 
residential development of a golf course constituted a taking.114  
Rahn Family LP (“Rahn”) purchased Carriage Hills Golf Course in 
1996 and subsequently began operating it.115  When the city 
updated its comprehensive plan six years later, the land on which 
the golf course sat was rezoned from “public facilities” to “parks.”116  
In 2003, Rahn agreed to sell the property to Wensmann Realty, Inc. 
(“Wensmann”) for commercial development as residential housing, 
contingent on the city reclassifying the property to permit such 
use.117  Shortly after Wensmann’s application for an amendment to 
the city plan was denied in 2004,118 Wensmann entered into an 
option agreement with Rahn to purchase the property.  The 
agreement required Wensmann to file suit against the city to grant 
the approvals necessary to rezone the land.119  Wensmann did so, 
alleging an unconstitutional taking.120 
In its analysis of the case, the court applied the Penn Central 
factors, reasoning that these were appropriate because the 
appellant was not requesting that the court interpret the Minnesota 
Constitution differently than the Federal Constitution.121  While 
issues of fact on the nature of the economic-impact factor 
 
347, 348 (1967) (“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding 
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”). 
 111. See infra text accompanying notes 190–96. 
 112. See infra text accompanying notes 190–97. 
 113. 734 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2007). 
 114. Id. at 629. 
 115. Id. at 627. 
 116. Id. at 627–28. 
 117. Id. at 628. 
 118. Id. at 628–29. 
 119. Id. at 629. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 633.  
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precluded the court from deciding the ultimate question,122 the 
court did fully analyze the claim under Penn Central’s rubric and 
thereby reached a number of conclusions.123  The court held that, 
in cases where the government chooses to maintain an existing 
comprehensive plan, the appropriate standard to be used is 
whether the regulation “leaves any reasonable, economically viable 
use of the property.”124  The court also held that the investment-
backed expectations factor weighed in favor of the city,125 while the 
character of the governmental action factor favored the 
developer.126 
Although buried in a footnote, the court’s observation that 
“[w]e do not view the McShane analysis as different from or 
inconsistent with the flexible approach to takings adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Penn Central”127 would come to be a key point of 
contention in the subsequent DeCook dispute over whether McShane 
established a separate Minnesota standard for airport zoning 
takings cases.128 
 
 122. Id. at 637. 
 123. See supra notes 118–20. 
 124. Wensmann Realty, Inc., 734 N.W.2d at 635.  In so doing, the court rejected 
both the city’s means of measurement (percent diminution in value from before 
and after the amendment of the comprehensive plan) and the developer’s 
(comparison of the value of the property as a golf course to its value as a 
residential development).  Id. at 634.  The court rejected the city’s measurement, 
however, because it “is not well suited to measure the economic impact of the 
government’s decision to maintain the status quo.”  Id. 
 125. Id. at 638. 
 126. Id. at 640. 
 127. Id. at 640 n.14. 
 128. Compare Brief for Respondents at 9, DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport 
Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 2011) (A09-969), 2009 WL 8187700, at 
*12 (interpreting the footnote to mean that “even under Penn Central, one of the 
three factors to be considered is the ‘character of the government action’”), with 
Reply Brief for Appellant at 6, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. A09-969) (arguing 
that the footnote shows that the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the view that 
McShane constituted a separate test).  In the Wensmann footnote, the court pointed 
to two sources which argue that McShane did articulate a separate standard.  
Wensmann, 734 N.W.2d at 641 n.14 (citing 25 JAMES R. DORSEY ET AL., MINNESOTA 
PRACTICE—REAL ESTATE LAW § 10.37 (Eileen M. Roberts ed., 2007) and Boylan, 
supra note 24, at 708).  In Wensmann, however, the court seemed more persuaded 
by an argument enunciated in Pratt v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 
774 (Minn. 1981), that “the principles enunciated in McShane for determining 
whether a taking has occurred must be applied with some flexibility.”  Wensmann, 
734 N.W.2d at 641 n.14 (citing Pratt, 309 N.W.2d at 774).  It is important to note, 
though, the factual circumstances of Pratt.  There, the Crow Wing County District 
Court interpreted a statute to declare certain waters public, even though those 
waters had previously been held privately.  Pratt, 309 N.W.2d at 769–70.  The court 
17
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Wensmann, with its application of the Penn Central factors, was 
based upon modification of a comprehensive land plan,129 while 
McShane dealt with the potential taking of land for a government 
enterprise.130  The significance of the distinction and the ambiguity 
of the footnote in Wensmann were not apparent until DeCook. 
III. THE DECOOK DECISION 
A. Background 
In 1989, plaintiffs Leon and Judith DeCook made two 
purchases,131 which resulted in their acquisition of 240 acres of land 
north of the Rochester International Airport.132  The DeCooks first 
purchased 217 acres on July 11 for $120,000.133  On December 22, 
the DeCooks purchased an additional twenty-three acres for 
$39,600,134 yielding a total purchase price for the entire property of 
$159,600.135  At the time of purchase, nineteen acres of the 
property were subject to the most restrictive class of land use 
regulations known as Safety Zone A.136  Safety Zone A restricted the 
 
then had to determine whether the government acted in an enterprise or 
arbitration capacity when it prohibited the use of mechanical harvesting devices 
on public waters.  Id. at 773–74.  It noted, “[McShane] presented the situation in 
which the governmental enterprise function of a regulation was not just 
predominant but exclusive.”  Id. at 774.  A plausible reading of the comment 
noted by the Wensmann court is that such flexibility was necessary in Pratt because 
the scenario did not fall neatly into either the arbitration or enterprise function.  
See Wensmann, 734 N.W.2d at 641 n.14. 
 129. Wensmann, 734 N.W.2d at 632–33. 
 130. McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. 1980). 
 131. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 3, DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 2009 WL 1513328 (D. 
Minn. Feb. 27, 2009) (No. 55-CV-06-3803), 2006 WL 6287378 [hereinafter 
Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion]. 
 132. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 302 
(Minn. 2011). 
 133. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 131, at 3.  The 
DeCooks purchased this land from Joseph and Shirley More.  Id.  This purchase 
included the eighty acres that would become the center of the dispute.  Id. 
 134. Id.  This land was purchased from the Sportsmen’s Recreation Club.  Id. 
 135. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302; Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, 
supra note 131, at 3. 
 136. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302; see MINN. R. 8800.2400, subpt. 5 (2009) 
(creating three safety zones around an airport).  Safety Zone A applies to the 
approach zone of a runway and “extends outward from the end of the primary 
surface a distance equal to two-thirds the runway length.”  Id.  Safety Zone B 
“extends outward from safety zone A a distance equal to one-third the runway 
length,” and Safety Zone C encompasses “all that land which is enclosed within the 
18
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use of land within the zone to agricultural or certain commercial 
and industrial uses, such as outdoor recreation, parking lots, and 
cemeteries,137 and the DeCooks were aware of this restriction when 
they bought the land.138  From the time of purchase, the DeCooks 
lived on the property and rented 217 acres of it for farming.139  
They began developing the eastern eighty acres of the property 
into a golf course in 1990140 and opened Oak Summit Golf Course, 
an eighteen-hole public golf course,141 on June 20, 1992.142  Since 
opening the golf course, the DeCooks have expanded it onto 
approximately 160 acres and continue to own and operate it.143 
Defendant Rochester International Airport Joint Zoning 
Board (Board)144 enacted further restrictions on land surrounding 
the airport in 2002 via Ordinance No. 4.145  The ordinance was 
instituted in furtherance of the airport’s master plan to allow a 
runway to be used as a precision instrument runway.146  Such 
runways are advantageous because they make it safer for airplanes 
to land during adverse weather conditions where visibility is 
 
perimeter of the horizontal zone . . . and which is not included in zone A or zone 
B.”  Id.  
 137. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302.  While the constraints on land in Zone A are 
quite restrictive, some uses of the land are permitted: 
Zone A shall contain no buildings, temporary structures, exposed 
transmission lines, or other similar land use structural hazards, and shall 
be restricted to those uses which will not create, attract, or bring together 
an assembly of persons thereon. Permitted uses may include, but are not 
limited to, such uses as agriculture (seasonal crops), horticulture, raising 
of livestock, animal husbandry, wildlife habitat, light outdoor recreation 
(nonspectator), cemeteries, and auto parking. 
MINN. R. 8800.2400, subpt. 6(B). 
 138. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., No. A09-969, 2010 
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 2010), aff’d, 796 
N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 2011). 
 139. Brief for Appellants at 3, DeCook, 2010 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419 
(No. A09-969) [hereinafter Appellants’ Appeals Brief]. 
 140. Id. 
 141. OAK SUMMIT GOLF COURSE, http://oaksummitgolf.com (last visited Sept. 
20, 2011).  The course offers league play, golf instruction, and tournaments.  Id. 
 142. Appellants’ Appeals Brief, supra note 139, at 3; see also DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 
at 302. 
 143. Appellants’ Appeals Brief, supra note 139, at 3. 
 144. The Board was created pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 360.063 (2011).  
Complaint ¶ II, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. 55-CV-06-3803).  The statute grants 
the Board authority to “adopt and enforce airport zoning regulations.”  MINN. 
STAT. § 360.063, subdiv. 3(a)(1).  The Board also has the authority to administer 
these regulations.  Id. at subdiv. 3(b). 
 145. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302. 
 146. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 131, at 7. 
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limited,147 but Minnesota law required them to maintain a wider 
approach zone.148  This ordinance further restricted the uses 
allowed in,149 and increased the size of,150 Safety Zone A from what 
the previous ordinance required.  After the enactment of 
Ordinance No. 4, twenty-eight additional acres of the DeCooks’ 
property were classified as Safety Zone A.151 
B. District Court 
The DeCooks commenced an inverse condemnation action 
against the Board in 2005, alleging that the ordinance had 
“substantially and materially reduced the owner’s legal ability to 
develop”152 the land and created a “substantial and measurable 
decline”153 in the market value of their property for the benefit of a 
governmental enterprise.154  In their complaint, the DeCooks 
asserted that the changes brought about by Ordinance No. 4 had 
decreased the market value of the property by at least $460,000.155  
In addition to denying that the zoning ordinance reduced either 
the DeCooks’ ability to develop the property or the property’s fair 
market value,156 the Board also argued, inter alia, that the takings 
claim was premature.157  The Board moved for summary judgment, 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  MINN. R. 8800.2400, subpt. 3(E) (2011) sets out the definition of a 
precision instrument approach zone, and MINN. R. 8800.1200, subpt. 5(E) (2011) 
requires:  
The precision instrument approach surface inclines upward and outward 
for a horizontal distance of 10,000 feet at a slope of 50:1, expanding 
uniformly to a width of 4,000 feet, then continues upward and outward 
for an additional horizontal distance of 40,000 feet at a slope of 40:1, 
expanding uniformly to an ultimate width of 16,000 feet. 
By contrast, the approach surface for non-precision instrument approaches is 
much smaller.  MINN. R. 8800.1200, subpt. 5(D). 
 149. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 302. 
 150. Id. at 303. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Complaint, supra note 144, ¶ VI. 
 153. Id. ¶ VIII. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. ¶ X. 
 156. Defendant’s Answer ¶ 6, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. 55-CV-06-3803), 
2006 WL 6287380. 
 157. Id. ¶ 10.  In its motion for summary judgment, the Board explains this 
position by pointing to case law holding that inverse condemnation actions 
alleging regulatory takings are not yet ripe if the landowner has not submitted a 
development plan for the property.  Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, 
supra note 131, at 17 (citing Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455 N.W.2d 512, 516 
20
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which was granted,158 and the DeCooks appealed.159 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
decision,160 holding that whether a diminution in value had 
occurred and the extent of such diminution were questions of fact.  
The court further held that whether a diminution is substantial is a 
question of law.161  The Minnesota Supreme Court denied the 
Board’s petition for review.162 
On remand, the jury returned a special verdict in November 
2008, establishing the diminution in value of the DeCooks’ 
property as $170,000.163  Applying the Penn Central factors per the 
Wensmann decision, the district court found that either a 3.5%164 or 
6.14%165 diminution in value did not constitute a taking.166 
 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990)).  The DeCooks had not done so.  Id. at 18.  Because this 
argument is not addressed in any appellate opinion, it seems likely that 
subsequent courts agreed with the response enunciated by the DeCooks: that they 
need not exhaust their administrative remedies before entering the courts because 
they wished to sell the property to another to develop, not to develop it 
themselves.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 11–12, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. 55-CV-06-3803), 
2006 WL 6287379 (citing McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 256 
(Minn. 1980)).  The DeCooks also argued that, even if a variance to build on the 
property had been applied for, Minnesota law would prevent the Board from 
granting that variance.  Id. at 12 (stating that the zoning ordinance prohibits a 
zoning board from granting a variance for any use of the property which is not 
permitted by the ordinance for property in the zone where the land is located 
(citing MINN. STAT. § 462.357, subdiv. 6(2) (2010))). 
 158. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 303. 
 159. Id. 
 160. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., No. A06-2170, 2007 
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 773, at *13 (Minn. Ct. App. July 31, 2007).  In so 
doing, the court applied the plaintiffs’ argument that McShane was still good law.  
Id. at *7–8.  It also points out that the Minnesota Court of Appeals is “‘not in [a] 
position to overturn established supreme court precedent.’”  Id. at *8 (quoting 
State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)). 
 161. Id. at *11 (citing Keenan v. Int’l Falls—Koochiching Cnty. Airport Zoning 
Bd., 357 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)). 
 162. Appellants’ Appeals Brief, supra note 139, at 2. 
 163. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 304.  The Board’s appraiser set the diminution at 
$110,000, while the DeCooks’ appraiser set the diminution at $425,000.  Id.  It is 
unclear how the jury reached its verdict of $170,000, but it could reflect the 
inherent difficulty in determining the value of land and, correspondingly, the 
challenge of ascertaining how much economic loss has resulted because of a 
regulation.  “Appraisal is as much an art as a science.”  Interview with Howard 
Roston, Partner, Malkerson Gunn Martin, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Aug. 17, 2011). 
 164. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 304 (taking $170,000 as a percentage of the 
Board’s appraiser’s value). 
 165. Id. (taking $170,000 as a percentage of the DeCooks’ appraiser’s value); 
see also infra note 185. 
 166. Or, to put it another way, the DeCooks’ property retained 93.86% (using 
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C. Court of Appeals 
The DeCooks appealed, arguing that McShane, not Penn 
Central, controlled the analysis of the issue167 and that, under either 
the McShane or Penn Central rules, the $170,000 reduction in value 
was enough to constitute a taking.168  While the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals agreed with the Board’s argument that McShane did not 
provide “a separate and independent legal test for regulatory 
takings,”169 and that Penn Central did govern the analysis of 
regulatory takings claims, it nevertheless reversed the district 
court’s decision that the diminution in value did not constitute a 
taking.170  The majority held that, even though the DeCooks realize 
a benefit as well as a burden from the proximity of their property to 
the airport, they “unequally bear the additional burden of use 
restrictions,”171 resulting in a diminution of the property’s value 
“with no commensurate benefit.”172  Requiring the DeCooks to 
sustain such a burden would be “manifestly unfair.”173 
Judge Matthew Johnson dissented from the opinion.174  In 
addition to taking issue with the majority’s failure to use “a 
recognized method of measuring the economic impact of the 
 
the Board’s pre-ordinance appraisal) or 96.5% (using the DeCooks’ pre-ordinance 
appraisal) of its value even after the enactment of the ordinance. 
 167. Appellants’ Appeals Brief, supra note 139, at 6–10.  The DeCooks point to 
the fact that, even though the McShane decision discusses Penn Central, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly adopted a different standard for enterprise 
zoning regulations.  Id. at 8–9.  They also point to the broader language of the 
Minnesota Constitution as a basis for asserting that they need not meet the higher 
“taken” standard of the Federal Constitution because their claim arises under the 
Minnesota Constitution and its broader language.  Id. at 10. 
 168. Id. at 11–12.  They do so by invoking the definition of “substantial” in the 
sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary: “[O]f real worth and importance, of 
considerable value and valuable.”  Id. at 11 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 
(6th ed. 1991)).  As the Board notes, this definition has been replaced in the 
dictionary’s most recent incarnation by defining substantial only “in the context of 
some defining legal test or concept.”  Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at 
4–5 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1565–66). 
 169. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., No. A09-969, 2010 
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 2010) (citing 
Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 641 n.14 (Minn. 2007), 
aff’d, 796 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 2011)). 
 170. Id. at *14. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. at *14–19 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
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alleged regulatory takings,”175 Judge Johnson also argued that the 
percent diminution in value of the property at issue did not rise to 
the level of a taking.176  He noted, “I am unable to find any 
regulatory takings cases in Minnesota caselaw or federal caselaw in 
which a property owner was successful with a diminution in value 
that is remotely close to the diminution in this case,”177 pointing 
also to cases where the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected 
regulatory takings claims on properties whose value was diminished 
by 75%178 and 92.5%.179  As such, “there is no precedent for the 
principle that a diminution in value of only six percent is enough 
to allow the conclusion that a compensable regulatory taking has 
occurred.”180 
D. Minnesota Supreme Court 
After granting review, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
determined that, in actions for a taking under the Minnesota 
Constitution where relief was based on airport zoning restrictions, 
the McShane rule applies.181  While noting that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has applied the Penn Central analysis in 
determining regulatory takings under the Minnesota 
Constitution,182 the court declined to do so in this instance because 
McShane drew a distinction between enterprise and arbitration 
regulations.183  While McShane did not expressly establish a separate 
standard for airport zoning regulation takings claims, “a review of 
the McShane briefs to [the Minnesota Supreme Court], and the 
precedent upon which [the justices] relied, make clear that the 
McShane test applies when relief is sought under the Minnesota 
 
 175. Id. at *15. 
 176. Id. at *18.  But see infra note 179. 
 177. DeCook, 2010 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *17–18. 
 178. Id. at *18 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 
(1926)). 
 179. Id. (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915)).  While both 
of these decisions were made before both Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central, the 
Supreme Court has subsequently cited both cases approvingly.  Id. at *16 (citing 
Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 
(1993)). 
 180. Id. at *18–19. 
 181. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 307 
(Minn. 2011). 
 182. Id. at 305. 
 183. Id. at 306 (citing McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 257–58 
(Minn. 1980)). 
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Constitution in airport zoning cases.”184   
Additionally, the court applied McShane and held that a taking 
had occurred because the diminution in value was substantial.185  
The court was persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument that, by 
common sense and dictionary definition, $170,000 is substantial.186  
To bolster this assertion, the court also pointed to a comparison of 
the diminution in value to the purchase price of the property in 
1989.187 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECOOK DECISION 
The court’s adoption of the McShane rule over a Penn Central 
analysis in airport zoning takings claims arising under the 
Minnesota Constitution seems to create a bright-line rule that does 
away with a criticism leveled at the Penn Central factors: inconsistent 
results.188  But in rejecting the Penn Central factors in favor of 
McShane, the court has both lowered the standard and simply 
rephrased the question.  The key issue now is whether a diminution 
in value of property as the result of such a regulation is 
“substantial.”189  Unfortunately, the court provides little insight into 
what this means,190 generating further uncertainty and reinforcing 
the ad hoc nature of takings claims. 
A. A Special Rule for Airport Zoning Regulatory Takings 
The McShane rule appears to set a lower standard for 
landowners by recognizing regulations that adversely affect their 
 
 184. Id. at 307. 
 185. Id. at 308–09.  It is worth noting that, while the court is not persuaded by 
the Board’s diminution in value argument, the figure it includes in the opinion is 
incorrect.  The opinion cites one measure that set the percent diminution in value 
at 6.4% using the pre-regulation value of the DeCooks’ property against the 
$170,000 jury verdict.  Id.  This is incorrect.  The DeCooks estimated the pre-
damage value at $4.8 million.  Id. at 304.  Dividing $4.8 million by $170,000 gives 
6.14%, not 6.4%.  Because the court correctly notes the value earlier in the 
opinion in its summary of the district court’s decision, it seems likely that this is a 
typographical error.  Id. at 304.  It is surprising, though, considering that a similar 
mathematical error was made, and subsequently not corrected by the DeCook 
decision, in McShane.  See supra note 88. 
 186. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 308. 
 187. Id.  The $170,000 jury award exceeds the $159,600 purchase price by 
$10,400. 
 188. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
 189. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 304. 
 190. Id. at 308. 
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property as takings.191  This is a boon to landowners, who now have 
a lower threshold to meet, and a potential liability for regulators.  
While DeCook made the McShane rule the law of the state, it remains 
to be seen whether carving out a separate standard for such a 
narrow segment of takings claims is advisable. 
One potential problem with maintaining this special rule for 
airport zoning regulation takings claims is that it is based upon a 
theory of takings analysis that has been significantly altered by its 
creator.192  Such an action should give pause when a theory’s 
staunchest advocate turns to understand the problem in a different 
and more complex way.193  This quibble may be irrelevant, however, 
because it is unclear whether a different outcome would result in 
DeCook by applying the modification of the rule advocated in 
Professor Sax’s subsequent article.194  
In Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, Professor Sax 
applied his spillover rule to three variations of an airport zoning 
dispute.195  In two of the cases, the first where a landowner wants 
“to build a tall structure that interferes with flights to and from the 
airport,”196 and the second where a landowner wants to live in an 
area that may be disturbed by airport noise,197 no compensation 
would be required.198  A third variation, however, that of a farmer 
wanting to farm a tract of land the airport would like to use for a 
runway,199 does merit compensation.200  The DeCook case shares 
similarities with scenario one in that airspace above the land, a 
common,201 is part of the dispute.  But unlike the first scenario, the 
 
 191. Accord Interview with Bradley Gunn, Partner, Malkerson Gunn Martin, in 
Minneapolis, Minn. (Aug. 17, 2011) (reading DeCook as adopting a lower threshold 
than Penn Central because the DeCook rule only addresses the economic impact of a 
regulation, ignoring investment-backed expectations and the character of the 
governmental action).  Contra Boylan, supra note 24, at 708 (referring to the 
McShane standard as a “heightened” one). 
 192. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 193. See Sax, supra note 48, at 150 n.5. 
 194. Id. at 164. 
 195. Id. at 164–65. 
 196. Id. at 164. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.  Compensation would not be required in the former case because the 
claim involves a decision over the use of a “common, the ambient air, to which 
both air travellers and landowners below a priori have an equal right of use.”  Id.  
In the latter case, there would again be no compensation because the conflict 
could be resolved in either direction.  Id. at 164–65.  
 199. Id. at 164. 
 200. Id. at 165. 
 201. The existence of a common “ought to be decided by a determination of 
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regulation seeks not to control merely the airspace but also the 
ground beneath it.  In this way, it is more like the third scenario.  
Even under Professor Sax’s modified rule, if a judge were to view 
the DeCook scenario as more closely analogous to the third than the 
first example, compensation would be required. 
Additionally, the creation of a rule for such a small segment of 
takings cases risks creating even more categories to which different 
standards could apply.  It is perhaps likely that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court will extend McShane to cover other enterprise 
regulations, thereby eliminating the problem of creating many 
rules with a very narrow focus.  Nevertheless, the specter of 
completely sullying the already-muddy202 waters of regulatory 
takings law still remains because, whether or not the court decides 
to extend McShane or to create more categories with special rules, 
discussion must focus on where to place the boundaries of these 
categories.  As has been seen in earlier cases,203 trying to decide 
where the borders are between categories can be just as intractable 
as resolving takings decisions under other rubrics.  All the 
affirmation of the McShane standard has done is rephrase the 
question without solving the problem. 
A virtue of the McShane rule is that, because it appears to 
create a bright-line test over a multi-factor balancing test like Penn 
Central’s, the rule should be easier to apply204 and therefore cause 
less uncertainty for potential litigants.  If there has been a 
significant economic impact on a claimant’s property, the 
government must compensate the landowner or repeal the 
ordinance that caused the reduction.  If the economic impact is not 
substantial, however, the regulation is not a taking, and no 
compensation is necessary.  The seeming merit of this 
straightforward test, however, is undercut by the court’s lack of 
instruction as to what constitutes the key component of the rule: 
“substantial.” 
 
whether a resource such as the ambient air is inextricably intertwined with the use 
of various properties.”  Id. at 164. 
 202. SKOURAS, supra note 2, at 30. 
 203. See Pratt v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 773–74 (Minn. 
1981), where the court had difficulty determining whether the regulation served 
an enterprise or an arbitration function. 
 204. This seems to abandon the motto of many previous takings cases, 
however, which emphasized the fact-specific nature of each particular inquiry.  
E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); 
Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 632 (Minn. 2007) (citing 
Westling v. Cnty. of Mille Lacs, 581 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 1998)). 
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B. What Is “Substantial”? 
After deciding that the McShane rule does constitute a separate 
test for airport zoning regulation takings claims, the court gives two 
reasons for finding a substantial diminution in value of the 
DeCooks’ property: $170,000 is substantial by any definition205 and 
the damages awarded by the jury exceed the DeCooks’ 1989 
purchase price.206  Both are problematic. 
The major problem with the court’s rule is that it does not 
provide a yardstick for measuring “substantial.”  While most 
Americans, this author included, would agree that $170,000 is a 
significant amount of money,207 surely such a value cannot be 
considered substantial in all contexts.208  When compared to the 
millions that many companies expend to run their businesses,209 or 
even the annual income of some Americans,210 such a sum, while 
nothing to scoff at, amounts to a small accounting error.211  
Conversely, smaller sums of money which, relative to $170,000, may 
 
 205. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 308 
(Minn. 2011). 
 206. Id. 
 207. When comparing his salary to the jury award, Justice Paul Anderson 
remarked, “I make $145,000, so $170,000 seems like a fair amount of money to 
me.”  Oral Argument at 1:47, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. A09-969), available at 
http://www.tpt.org/courts/MNJudicialBranchvideo_NEW.php?number=A090969.  
Accord Stuart Alger, $170,000 Is Still a Lot of Money, the Minnesota Supreme Court Says, 
COM. REAL EST. TRENDS (May 10, 2010), http://cretrends.com/170000-is-still-a-lot-
of-money-the-minnesota-supreme-court-says. 
 208. See Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at 5 (noting that without 
considering diminution in value, “courts have no principled method for weighing 
the legal consequence of the number”); see also supra text accompanying notes 49–
52.  Cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“[V]alues are relative.”). 
 209. For example, Target spent $45.7 billion for cost of sales in 2010, with net 
earnings of $2.9 billion.  TARGET CORP., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2010), available 
at http://sites.target.com/images/company/annual_report_2010/documents 
/Target_AnnualReport_2010.pdf. 
 210. In 2010, the average per capita income in Minnesota was $42,843.  State 
Annual Personal Income, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/ (select “summary” under “step 1”; then select 
“per capita personal income” and “2010” under “step 2”; then follow “display” 
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).  By contrast, media mogul Oprah Winfrey 
raked in $290 million in the same year, and pop star Lady Gaga took home $90 
million.  Dorothy Pomerantz, Lady Gaga Tops Celebrity 100 List, FORBES.COM (May 
18, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://forbes.com/2011/05/16/lady-gaga-tops-celebrity-100-
11.html. 
 211. $170,000 represents 0.00037% of Target’s 2010 cost of sales but nearly 
397% of the average Minnesotan’s annual income. 
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not be incredibly large, may still be substantial relative to the 
overall value of the property.  Would an airport zoning ordinance 
which reduces the market value of a $50,000 property to $25,000 be 
substantial enough to constitute a taking?212  DeCook does not say.  
The rule that emerges from the court’s reasoning in this regard is 
analogous to Justice Stewart’s famous line about pornography: “I 
know it when I see it.”213  While such a statement makes for good 
rhetoric, it does little to elucidate the law.  
Additionally, it is puzzling that the Board’s calculation of the 
DeCooks’ loss based on percent diminution in value214 was rejected 
in favor of a set dollar value, especially since the McShane court 
points to the percent diminution in value as the means of 
measuring damages in that instance.215  The DeCook court’s decision 
does away with Justice Brandeis’s denominator problem by tossing 
the numerator out with the denominator.216  
Moving the numbers from a takings scenario to a contract 
dispute further illustrates the difficulty of this holding.  A 
subcontractor who agreed to provide $100,000 worth of services 
would be laughed out of court if he were to provide only $6,140 
worth of those services and then demand payment on the contract, 
minus damages for breach, because he had substantially 
performed.217  Yet the same percentage in an airport zoning takings 
 
 212. What about a $15,000 reduction in the value of a property valued at 
$20,000 before implementation of the regulation?  Under a percent diminution 
test, an ordinance causing a seventy-five percent reduction would very likely 
constitute a taking.  But $15,000 is less than ten percent of $170,000.  Is that 
enough to be “substantial?”  Or is the dollar value of the loss only relevant when 
the percent diminution in value really is de minimis, giving affected property 
owners a second bite at the apple through DeCook? 
 213. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 214. DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 308 
(Minn. 2011). 
 215. McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 258–59 (Minn. 1980). 
 216. The court did leave open the possibility of using percent diminution in 
value in some instances, reasoning that “in some other regulatory takings dispute, 
arithmetic calculations such as those urged by the Board will be persuasive.”  
DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 308.  The court provides no insight, however, into the 
situations where such a rule would be appropriate.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 225–26. 
 217. See CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH 793 (2010) (noting that substantial performance triggers the aggrieved 
party’s promise to pay, less damages as the result of breach, while the aggrieved 
party’s promise to pay does not arise if there is a material breach).  See also 11 
ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.6 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 
Matthew Bender 2011) (discussing the difference between damages and 
restitution). 
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claim is regarded as substantial by the Minnesota Supreme Court.  
How is the value in the contract dispute different from the value in 
the takings dispute? 
To use an example from popular culture, when someone is 
searching the Internet for reviews of a recent theatrical release, it is 
crucial to know out of how many possible stars218 or thumbs219 a 
movie is rated.  The Internet Movie Database allows users to rate 
films they have seen using a scale of one to ten stars, with ten being 
the highest.220  The tabloid magazine People also reviews films and 
rates them using stars, but four stars is the highest honor a movie 
can earn.221  A film recommended by both the late Gene Siskel and 
Roger Ebert would earn two thumbs up.222  Knowing a film received 
a two, then, is meaningless unless it is clear into which system the 
two is placed.  A two from the Internet Movie Database, where the 
movie earned only a fifth of the total stars potentially awarded, 
might lead a person to skip the film altogether.  A People review of 
two, however, where a film took home half of its star potential, 
might warrant a rental fee once the film is available for home 
viewing.  Two thumbs up, though, could be enough of an 
endorsement to induce a movie buff to swallow the ticket price for 
a first-run theater experience at the soonest available moment.  Just 
as two in this example means little beyond abstract theoretical 
concepts, so does $170,000 without any context. 
Comparing the 2006 jury award to the 1989 purchase price in 
order to support the assertion that the diminution in value was 
substantial is nonsensical.  Such analysis does not take inflation of 
the purchase price into account,223 nor does it reflect the increase 
 
 218. This is the rating symbol used by the Internet Movie Database. THE 
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://imdb.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). 
 219. This was the rating symbol formerly used by movie critics Gene Siskel and 
Roger Ebert.  Joel Sternberg, Siskel and Ebert, THE MUSEUM OF BROADCAST COMM., 
http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=siskelandeb (last visited Sept. 
18, 2011). 
 220. E.g., Transformers: Dark of the Moon User Ratings, THE INTERNET MOVIE 
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1399103/ratings (last visited Sept. 18, 
2011). 
 221. E.g., Alynda Wheat, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part 2: People 
Critic’s Review, PEOPLE (July 15, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.people.com/people 
/article/0,,20509509,00.html. 
 222. See supra note 219. 
 223. The 1989 purchase price of $159,600 had the buying power of 
$277,115.80 in 2008, when the jury’s award was announced.  CPI Inflation 
Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2011).  This is more than $100,000 greater than the jury award. 
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in value that accrued to the property during the seventeen years 
between when the DeCooks purchased it and when they filed 
suit.224  This author fails to see how the relationship between these 
two values has any bearing on whether or not a taking has 
occurred. 
It is possible that the Minnesota Supreme Court was not 
persuaded by the diminution in value argument because it 
considers such a measure to be part of the Penn Central test, with its 
spawn of subsequent litigation, and not a key element of the 
McShane rule.225  While the court leaves the door open to such an 
argument, it does not specify when it might be persuasive.226 
C. Potential Impact 
Aside from offering little guidance to landowners and local 
zoning officials as to what makes a diminution in value substantial 
enough to constitute a taking, the DeCook decision is likely to have a 
cooling effect on other municipal airports within the state227 and on 
regulation of the Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport.228  
The rule does “not end airport zoning, but it would constantly push 
zoning authorities to discount safety and efficiency in favor of 
unrestricted use by landowners by making their interests the one 
thing that cannot be balanced, only bought.”229  In this instance, 
the Board is, at the time of this writing, in the process of repealing 
 
 224. The pre-damage value of the property was $4.8 million by the DeCooks’ 
estimate and $2.77 million by the Board’s.  DeCook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint 
Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn. 2011). 
 225. Interview with Bradley Gunn, supra note 191. 
 226. DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 308; see supra note 216. 
 227. See, e.g., Jeanne Schram, Residents Express Concern About Airport Zoning 
Ordinance, AITKIN INDEPENDENT AGE (Mar. 23, 2011, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.aitkinage.com/news/item/6118-residents-express-concern-about-
airport-zoning-ordinance (discussing the third public hearing regarding Aitkin 
Airport zoning changes and emphasizing the several objections by local citizens).  
 228. The Metropolitan Airports Commission was one of five parties to file 
amicus curiae briefs with the court.  DeCook, 796 N.W.2d at 301.  Local officials are 
also worried: “For the Rochester International Airport, any future expansion 
project that causes nearly any reduction in property value for adjacent property 
owners will have to be re-examined in order to determine the ‘takings’ cost to the 
City.”  Michael Wojcik, City Loses Airport Lawsuit, VOTEWOJCIK.ORG (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.votewojcik.org/?p=1075 (citing Letter from Terry Adkins, City Att’y, 
Rochester, to Michael Wojcik, Councilman, Rochester City Council (date 
unspecified) (on file with Michael Wojcik)).  Mr. Adkins is also concerned about 
the effect the ruling will have on the Metropolitan Airports Commission.  Id.  
 229. Brief for Metropolitan Airports Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellant at 9, DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. A09-969). 
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the ordinance rather than compensating the DeCooks for the jury’s 
award.230 
With only a new rule and the “$170,000 is substantial” 
guideline to go by, airports may rethink any modification of their 
zoning ordinances for fear of litigation or the fiscal impossibility of 
compensating every adjacent landowner for a deprivation of 
property rights which may be more theoretical than actual.231  Such 
a result could impede implementation of the safest and most 
current aviation technology232 and potentially impact the local and 
regional economy if carriers can no longer utilize airports as 
effectively because those airports do not support current 
technology. 
V. CONCLUSION 
After adopting the McShane standard for airport zoning 
regulation takings claims and rejecting the Board’s percent 
diminution in value as a measure for determining whether a 
reduction in market value is significant, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has left communities throughout the state without a means 
of accurately determining whether their current or potential 
airport regulations effect takings.  While advocates for a rigid 
system of private property may cheer in this particular instance, the 
resulting uncertainty of the decision is far from beneficial and only 
further muddles the already murky233 waters of takings 
jurisprudence.  A defendant’s best argument in an inverse 
condemnation action now is not the presentation of a de minimis 
percent diminution in value of the property in question but the 
 
 230. Answer Man, No Payments Made to Plaintiffs in Zoning Case, ROCHESTER 
POST-BULLETIN, Apr. 14, 2011, at A2. If the Board is successful, the DeCooks will 
likely seek to recover damages for the temporary taking of their land from the 
time of the ordinance’s enactment through its repeal.  Interview with Bradley 
Gunn, supra note 191. 
 231. It is unclear what harm was actually done to the development potential of 
the DeCooks’ property, as the DeCooks had not submitted any development plans 
to the Board.  Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 131, at 9.  As 
the Board points out, much of the land impacted by Zone A is a ravine visible in 
aerial photographs of the property.  Brief for Appellant at 5 DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 
299 (No. A09-969) (pointing out that the land contains “dense trees, moderate to 
steep slopes, and a drainage way”). 
 232. See Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 131, at 7, 26, 33.  
Enabling technological innovation was the impetus behind Ordinance No. 4.  
Brief for Appellant at 5 DeCook, 796 N.W.2d 299 (No. A09-969). 
 233. SKOURAS, supra note 2, at 30. 
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hope that the presiding judge will not consider the damages award 
especially large relative to her salary. 
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